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1 Introduction
For much of the centuries-spanning philosophical debate on 
the mind, the problem of the nature of representation and of 
representational content has had pride of place. This central 
role has not been jeopardised by the advent of the cogni-
tive sciences, representation being one of the foundational 
notions behind that scientific endeavour. The philosophical 
problem of representation has become, therefore, scientifi-
cally interesting and pressing.
This paper is concerned with two central issues regarding 
the nature and role of representation in cognitive science, 
namely its ontological status—are representations and repre-
sentational contents real features of cognitive systems?—and 
its explanatory value—are representations explanatorily use-
ful, and, if so, how? I will focus on the notion of representa-
tion and content of subpersonal states—i.e. cognitive states 
short of beliefs, desires, and other propositional attitudes—
which plays an important role in the cognitive sciences. To 
avoid confusion, I use the expression ‘representational con-
tent’ to refer to the contents of subpersonal states, which I 
normally refer to as ‘cognitive states’, while I reserve the 
expression ‘intentional content’ to refer to the contents of 
personal states, such as propositional attitudes, which I refer 
to as ‘intentional states.’1
Traditionally, three mutually exclusive views about the 
ontological and explanatory status of representations were 
supposed to be the only conceptual options on the table: 
robust realism, eliminativism, and primitivism.
Roughly, robust realists hold that representations and 
representational content are real features of cognitive sys-
tems, which can be given reductive explanations in purely 
Abstract In the literature on the nature and role of cogni-
tive representation, three positions are taken across the con-
ceptual landscape: robust realism, primitivism, and elimi-
nativism. Recently, a fourth alternative that tries to avoid 
the shortcomings of traditional views has been proposed: 
content pragmatism. My aim is to defend pragmatism about 
content against some recent objections moved against the 
view. According to these objections, content pragmatism 
(a) fails to capture the role played by representation in the 
cognitive sciences; and/or (b) is an unstable view that ends 
up collapsing into one of the traditional alternatives. I argue 
that those arguments fail. I show that content pragmatism 
has as much claim to descriptive adequacy as the traditional 
theories. Moreover, I defend the robustness of the view by 
arguing that it does not collapse into any of the traditional 
positions. Content pragmatism therefore offers a valid and 
coherent account of the nature of representational content.
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naturalistic and non-representational terms (e.g. Fodor 1975; 
Dretske 1981; Millikan 1984). On this view, some inner 
states of cognitive systems have representational content due 
to their standing in some special natural relation to what 
they represent. Representations and contents are explanato-
rily useful, at least in part, because they consist of properties 
that cognitive systems actually possess.
Eliminativists, on the other hand, believe that our best 
cognitive sciences will do away with appeal to representa-
tion and content, producing instead explanations at a purely 
functional or neurophysiological level. Eliminativists hold 
that propositional attitudes and intentional content are prob-
able candidates for elimination from future cognitive science 
(e.g. Churchland 1981; Stich 1983), while more radical elim-
inativists have claimed that even representational content 
will be eliminated (e.g. Van Gelder 1995; Hutto and Myin 
2013). The issue of how to give a naturalistic reduction of 
representation thereby does not exercise the eliminativist, 
though they must show that equally satisfying explanations 
of cognitive phenomena can be provided without appeal to 
representations.
Primitivists, finally, hold that the notions of representa-
tion and content play a crucial role in the successful and 
fruitful cognitive sciences, and this suffices for taking them 
as real entities in cognitive systems (e.g. Burge 2010). They 
are scientific primitives, which need not be themselves 
further explained, or naturalised. Primitivists have been 
accused of holding a form of dualism, since they seem to 
consider representation and content to be notions that cannot 
be naturalised. I think this accusation is misguided. Primi-
tivism in the lines of Burge (2010) is monist naturalism—it 
takes representation to be a scientific posit in no need of 
naturalisation, as much as fundamental entities posited in 
physics do not call for naturalisation, insofar as they are part 
of a successful and fruitful science. This view does not entail 
dualism, as it is compatible with materialism.
Recently, a fourth alternative, content pragmatism, has 
been forcefully put forward by Egan in a series of papers 
(1999, 2009, 2010, 2014b). She argues that representation 
and content should be seen as ineliminable parts of cognitive 
science, contra the eliminativist; but she rejects the view that 
those notions capture anything real in cognitive systems—
contra realists and primitivists—content being rather part of 
an explanatory gloss dependent on pragmatic considerations.
In the last few years, Egan’s attempt at building a fourth 
alternative has come under attack by Neander,2 Ramsey,3 
and Bechtel (2016). My aim in this paper is to defend con-
tent pragmatism from recent objections, showing that it is 
a valid alternative to the traditional positions. I do not want 
to argue that content pragmatism is true, but only that it is, 
those objections notwithstanding, coherent and motivated.
Here is how I will proceed in what follows. In Sect. 2, 
I present the main tenets of content pragmatism, without 
committing to the details of Egan’s view. I examine four 
lines of objection to content pragmatism in Sect. 3, accord-
ing to which the view is not descriptively accurate; and/
or collapses either into primitivism; eliminativism; or real-
ism. I argue that all four lines of objection fail, and thus 
the cogency of content pragmatism is preserved. In conse-
quence, content pragmatism should be considered to be at 
least on par with traditional positions: a serious contestant in 
shedding light on the nature and role of representation and 
content in the cognitive sciences.
2  Content Pragmatism
The starting point for Egan’s content pragmatism is the role 
the notion of representation is supposed to play in the cogni-
tive sciences. Her project is that of describing and making 
sense of the commitments of our best sciences of the mind, 
with special attention to their more promising (and main-
stream) branch: computational cognitive science.
According to Egan, computational explanations in cogni-
tive science are function-theoretic in nature: they unveil the 
mathematical functions computed by internal mechanisms 
of cognitive systems that help explain behavioural success. 
One of Egan’s favourite examples is Marr’s theory of how 
the early visual system detects edges by calculating the 
rate of change in the intensity of light reaching the retina.4 
The ability to detect edges is enabled by the fact that the 
early visual system computes a mathematical function: the 
Laplacian operator convolved with the Gaussian operator. 
This mathematical function is general, inasmuch as it is not 
required that inputs be light intensities and outputs edges, 
and is applicable to several other domains; it belongs moreo-
ver to a class of well-understood mathematical tools. Egan 
claims that this is the primary characterisation of cognitive 
mechanisms in computational cognitive science: what expla-
nations provide are purely computational, function-theoretic 
characterisations of the computations carried out by cogni-
tive systems and parts thereof.
2 ‘Why I’m not a Content Pragmatist’, unpublished paper presented 
at the 2015 Minds Online Conference. Available online at: http://
mindsonline.philosophyofbrains.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/
Why-I%E2%80%99m-not-a-Content-Pragmatist.pdf.
3 ‘Against Representation Deflation’, presentation at the conference 
’Mental Representations, the foundation of Cognitive Science?’, 4 See Marr (1982), Egan (2010, 2014b).
Ruhr-Universität Bochum, 21−23 September 2015. Available online 
at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mgq6uo9cDdY .
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Importantly, the function-theoretic characterisation does 
not involve distal content. The system is explained, and its 
parts individuated, in terms of the algorithms implemented 
in computing the relevant explanatory mathematical func-
tion. Distal representational contents are not mentioned in 
the theory itself, the latter being characteristically ‘envi-
ronment-neutral’ (Egan 2014b, p. 122). The computational 
mechanism that computes the Laplacean convolved with 
the Gaussian does so regardless of the environment it finds 
itself in, and therefore regardless of the relations that input 
systems bear to things in the world. Were the inputs to the 
mechanism transduced from sound waves rather than light 
intensities, the mechanism would still compute the same 
mathematical function over those inputs. These features are 
not restricted to this particular example, but are supposed to 
be generalisable to most if not all endeavours in computa-
tional cognitive science.5
Crucially, for Egan, the relations between cognitive mech-
anisms and the environment, which typically are relied upon 
to determine representational content—according at least to 
mainstream theories of content, which are externalist—play 
no role in individuating cognitive mechanisms. Computa-
tional cognitive science individuates cognitive mechanisms 
not by their representational contents, but rather by their 
computational, function-theoretic, environment-neutral 
characterisation.6
A place for representational content in computational 
cognitive science is nonetheless preserved, for appeal to 
content is unavoidable in explanations of cognitive abilities. 
The explananda of cognitive science are typically tasks that 
are pre-theoretically characterised in distal terms, in terms 
of capacities sported by organisms in their interactions with 
their environments. Success in those tasks is presupposed, 
being what cognitive science tries to explain. In order to 
make clear how the computationally-individuated mecha-
nisms unveiled by computational cognitive science can be 
the explanantia of those distally-individuated explananda, 
an interpretation of the computational goings-on in terms of 
distal features of the environment is called for. That interpre-
tation involves representational content: states and processes 
of the computational mechanism are seen as representing 
entities and processes in the world. In this way, a connection 
is established between the computational mechanism and the 
cognitive task it is meant to explain.
Importantly, such an interpretation is not part of the com-
putational theory proper. Rather, the interpretation of cogni-
tive mechanisms in representational terms is part of what 
Egan variously calls the ‘explanatory’ (2014a, b), ‘cognitive’ 
(2010), or ‘intentional gloss’ (2014b). The gloss, by includ-
ing reference to distal content, allows us to see how comput-
ing certain mathematical functions in a certain environment 
constitutes the performance of a cognitive task.
Beside playing the role of ‘connective tissue’ between 
computational story and pre-theoretical explanandum, the 
gloss also has a heuristic value. It allows theorists more eas-
ily to grasp what the computational processes in the cogni-
tive system are doing, and how the information flow inside 
the system proceeds. By seeing those processes as being 
carried out over states with distal representational content, 
the computational goings-on in the system become easier to 
understand and synthetically describe.
Other pragmatic considerations also contribute to the fixa-
tion of the content ascribed to cognitive states and processes 
(Egan 2014b, pp. 125ff.). Ascribed contents must be salient 
and tractable, and should not be too disjunctive or opaque. 
The representational interpretation may not perfectly match 
the computational description of the system—one-to-one 
mappings between computational states and contents may 
be given up, provided that this increases expository clarity. 
Moreover, depending on the level of generality that is sup-
posed to be achieved by the cognitive gloss, more or less 
general contents may be ascribed.
The same computational system may contribute to dif-
ferent cognitive tasks, involving different types of input 
and output (e.g. visual vs. auditory), in different contexts. 
Depending on explanatory aims and interests, content ascrip-
tion may try to capture the specific contributions made in the 
different contexts, thereby, for instance, ascribing visual con-
tents in one type of case and auditory contents in another; or 
it may strive for generality by ascribing disjunctive contents, 
e.g. both visual and auditory; or it may strive for yet greater 
generality by ascribing proximal representational contents 
which are fully independent of context, e.g. changes in inten-
sity of the input signal.
Individuation in computational cognitive science involves 
primarily the function-theoretic characterisation, which 
remains constant with change of explanatory context, 
embedding environment, different weight given to differ-
ent pragmatic considerations, and so forth. Representational 
content, on the other hand, may vary with changes in each 
of these factors. Different content ascriptions do not affect 
the individuation of the computational states and processes 
that are the explanantia of computational cognitive science. 
What is essential to the explanantia is the computations 
5 Egan (2010, 2014b) draws on several other examples from compu-
tational cognitive science, such as Shadmehr and Wise’s (2005) the-
ory of motor control.
6 In her more recent work, Egan (2014b) has argued that computa-
tional states have one kind of content essentially, i.e. mathemati-
cal content. I think this move introduces considerable and unneces-
sary complications, and should therefore be rejected (cf. Piccinini 
2015, pp. 137–8). I will thus stick to formulations of the view that do 
not posit this new kind of content.
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they perform, not the representational contents that may be 
ascribed to them.
In sum, representational content, though not part of the 
purely function-theoretic characterisations employed by 
computational cognitive science, plays a pragmatic role 
in allowing us to understand how cognitive computational 
systems work, and how their workings amount to the per-
formance of pre-theoretically characterised cognitive tasks. 
Content is thereby fixed not by means of natural relations 
between certain cognitive states and entities in the world, as 
per the robust realist view, but rather by pragmatic consid-
erations motivated by the explanatory aims of theorists, as 
well as the heuristic value of ascribing content to computa-
tional states and processes.
3  Content Pragmatism Assessed
In recent years, partly due to the frustration felt in some phil-
osophical quarters with the project of naturalising content, 
and partly thanks to Egan’s compelling advocacy, content 
pragmatism has attracted considerable attention, as well as 
criticism. The most vocal direct opposition has been put up 
by William Ramsey, Karen Neander, and Bechtel (2016).7
Ramsey and Neander make use of the same strategy in 
arguing against content pragmatism. As we have seen, the 
view is supposed to provide an alternative path in the phil-
osophical attempt of understanding the nature and role of 
representation and content, eschewing robust realism, elimi-
nativism, and primitivism—the traditional positions, often 
taken to be exhaustive of the conceptual landscape. Neander 
and Ramsey argue that this is an illusion: content pragma-
tism is not a stable position, and thus ends up collapsing into 
one of the traditional views.
Bechtel, on the other hand, focuses on the putative lack 
of descriptive adequacy of content pragmatism in capturing 
the way cognitive scientists use the notion of representation 
in their theories. I will start with Bechtel’s critique, and then 
move on to Neander’s and Ramsey’s.
3.1  Descriptive Accuracy
Bechtel (2016) argues that content pragmatism is at odds 
with the practices of cognitive science. It seems, indeed, 
that cognitive scientists make use of representations not 
as explanatory glosses to be provided once their theories 
are complete, but rather as research-guiding hypotheses 
about the nature of states and processes in the cognitive 
system. Bechtel examines one case study, the discovery 
and development of theories of spatial representation in the 
rodent brain—which came to be known as ‘cognitive maps’ 
(Tolman, 1948; O’Keefe and Nadel, 1978). In the decades 
that followed the original discovery of place cells, grid cells, 
head-direction cells and other processes that play a role in 
spatial representation and navigation have been found (cf. 
Moser et al., 2008). Bechtel’s aim is to show, contra Egan, 
that the positing of representations, rather than working as 
a mere gloss, actually involves strong ontological commit-
ments, drives new research endeavours, and deeply informs 
theorising in cognitive science.
... treating brain processes as representations is foun-
dational to these research projects as they have been 
pursued. The research pursuits are focused on identi-
fying what neural processes serve as representational 
vehicles and especially determining what they repre-
sent. The research efforts are designed to answer these 
questions and it would be difficult to understand why 
the researchers pursue these projects if their goal was 
not to identify representations and determine what they 
represent. (Bechtel 2016, p. 1289)
Bechtel then describes in great detail the process of dis-
covery and theoretical development that have marked sci-
entific work on place, grid, and head-direction cells in the 
past four decades. He uses this careful reconstruction of pro-
gress in this area, what motivated it and what it was directed 
at explaining, to argue that a commitment to the reality of 
representations was essential for that scientific project. The 
whole process would have seemed absurd and meaningless 
were talk of representation to be taken as merely providing 
an explanatory gloss, rather than as capturing real entities 
in the rodent cognitive system. Though Bechtel’s careful 
treatment of the discovery of place, grid, and head-direction 
cells is historically and philosophically interesting, I think 
that he fails in his attempt to undermine content pragmatism 
by means of this case study.
Bechtel is right that prima facie content pragmatism is 
not descriptively accurate. As he points out, most of cogni-
tive science traffics in representational talk. However, more 
must be shown if his line of objection is to be successful: 
he must establish that talk of representation is justified 
and substantive, and not a mere matter of scientific herit-
age. Ramsey (2007), examining this issue, concludes that 
the latter is more often the truth: most of cognitive science 
works with an excessively weak notion of representation 
based on mere causal correlation, what he dubs the ‘recep-
tor notion.’8 The receptor notion, he then argues, fails to 
8 This is indeed how Sullivan (2010) defines the notion of represen-
tation at play in cognitive neuroscience and neurobiology. She then 
goes on to argue that in many cases talk of representation only plays a 
minimal, heuristic role, in research and explanation.7 Sprevak (2013) presents and criticises a related view— fictional-
ism, treatment of which is beyond the scope of this paper.
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distinguish representations from mere causal relays. Most 
talk of representation in cognitive science could be replaced 
with talk of causal relays without loss of explanatory value. 
Appeal to receptor-representations, for Ramsey, does not 
buy us anything explanatorily useful in comparison to appeal 
to causally mediating states, and should thereby be excluded 
from theorising in cognitive science.
Ramsey’s sceptical results about the presence of a sub-
stantial notion of representation in contemporary cognitive 
science have been compellingly countered by Sprevak (2011) 
and Shagrir (2012), at least for what regards some areas of 
enquiry. At any rate, the cautious note that Ramsey urges on 
us remains in force: talk of representation in the cognitive 
sciences, though widespread, may be largely empty, and we 
must examine in each case whether it is playing its proper 
explanatory role. The fact that cognitive scientists routinely 
deploy the term ‘representation’ should not thereby lure us 
into believing that they are actually positing the existence 
of robust representations in cognitive systems—they might 
be simply talking about causal relays, and using representa-
tional talk for its heuristic value.
Furthermore, Bechtel’s case study is fully compat-
ible with the tenets of content pragmatism. As the content 
pragmatist points out, the notion of representation plays a 
crucial role in cognitive science inasmuch as it allows us 
to connect the computational explanantia with the distally-
individuated explananda of cognitive science. It is natural 
for cognitive scientists to start with the cognitive task they 
want to explain, and which is individuated in terms of the 
relationships between organism and environment—in the 
case at hand, the ability of rodents to navigate space. That 
choice of explanatory target is essential in directing scien-
tific research toward the discovery of the computational 
mechanisms behind the feat.
The fact that an ‘early and integral step’ in cognitive 
science is that of “using investigations of content to help 
identify the vehicles”9 is thereby in harmony with content 
pragmatism. The cognitive task, which is externally-individ-
uated, is typically the starting point for research in cognitive 
science: it is the choice of explanandum that constrains the 
scientific investigation that follows. This does not mean that 
talk of representation must be taken as ontologically com-
mitting; it may well be, as the content pragmatist insists, a 
useful way of connecting goings-on in the cognitive system 
with the behaviour to be explained—an explanatory gloss.
After determining the explanatory target, cognitive scien-
tists try to figure out what internal computational processes 
can explain behavioural success—what the computational 
vehicles are, e.g. in spatial navigation. This involves dis-
covering which stimuli neurons respond to, as well as their 
causal relationships with other neurons and networks. This 
allows cognitive scientists to individuate the neurons and 
networks that are good candidates for realising the compu-
tational mechanisms behind the successful performance of 
the cognitive task. Once plausible candidates are found, it 
is only by taking them to be representing (or, more weakly, 
carrying information about) entities and processes in the 
environment that the connexion between computational 
mechanisms and cognitive task target of the explanation 
can be established.
The fact, repeatedly appealed to by Bechtel (2016), that 
cognitive scientists are interested in finding out what neu-
ral states represent is perfectly in line with what the con-
tent pragmatist holds. It is indeed a central step in trying 
to individuate the computational mechanisms that explain 
successful cognitive behaviour. The content pragmatist does 
not deny the importance of the notion of representation in 
the ‘context of discovery.’10 The gloss that representation 
provides not only allows us to keep the explanatory target in 
view, but it also makes it simpler to understand the role that 
computational goings-on in the cognitive system play in suc-
cessful completion of the task. However, this does not entail 
that, in the ‘context of justification,’ an ontological commit-
ment to cognitive representations is necessary. It does not 
follow from anything that Bechtel claims about how research 
in rodent navigation has proceeded that a robust realist posi-
tion about representation needs to be accepted in order to 
do justice to scientific practice. That practice is compatible 
with the tenets of content pragmatism as well. Therefore, I 
submit, the content pragmatist escapes Bechtel’s objection 
from descriptive accuracy.
3.2  Pragmatism and Primitivism
The second line of attack against content pragmatism 
involves claiming that the view is too unstable, its insta-
bility making it collapse into one of the traditional views 
of representational content. Neander worries that content 
pragmatism might fall into some form of dualism, or rather 
primitivism. For the content pragmatist, the argument runs, 
content ascription depends on explanatory aims and inter-
ests, which are ultimately based on the intentions of humans. 
However, intentions are states with content. For the account 
to work in a non-circular way, the contents of the intentional 
states grounding the aims and interests of humans seem to 
have to be taken as primitive.
Egan insists that her account is targeted only at represen-
tational content (short of beliefs and desires), and not at the 
intentional content of propositional attitudes. The content of 
9 Bechtel (2016, p. 1291).
10 I am using the term, and its usual companion, in a somewhat loose 
sense.
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cognitive states would be parasitic on intentional content, for 
it is the latter that helps determine the content of the former. 
In this way, she can avoid committing to primitivism, leav-
ing open the question of the nature of intentional content. 
But then, Neander presses on, content pragmatism accounts 
for only a part of the problem of content, being completely 
silent on intentional content, on which representational con-
tent depends. The content pragmatist thus fails to offer a 
complete theory of how content is possible in our world.
Moreover, they would have to subscribe to a heterodox 
view of how the project of explaining representation should 
go. The strategy typically taken to be more promising has 
been to try and give an account of simpler cognitive states, 
so as to later build a more encompassing theory on this 
basis, perhaps by adding extra factors in order to include 
intentional states.
These are fair worries, I believe, but they fall short of 
undermining content pragmatism, let alone lead it to col-
lapse into dualism or primitivism, or even robust realism 
about intentional content. The view does not collapse into 
dualism or primitivism because the kind of content it appeals 
to in helping to determine representational content is inten-
tional content. Being a different kind of content, intentional 
content is plausibly to be explained by a different theory, tar-
geted to that domain of phenomena.11 Moreover, the content 
pragmatist need not endorse robust realism about intentional 
content. Alternative views of intentional content are avail-
able. For instance, Dennett’s (1981, 1987) Intentional Stance 
view is supposed to account for the intentional content of 
propositional attitudes without thereby endorsing robust 
realism about intentional content.12
This latter line of reply makes the prospects of content 
pragmatism partially depend on the fate of non-robustly real-
ist theories of intentional content, such as Dennett’s. This is, 
though, no reason to reject content pragmatism: the game is 
still on as to which kind of approach to intentional content 
will eventually prevail.13
3.3  Pragmatism and Eliminativism
Content pragmatism and content eliminativism share one 
crucial element: both views deny robust realism about rep-
resentational content. However, content pragmatism and 
content eliminativism are at odds in an equally crucial 
point: while the latter advocates elimination of the notion 
of representation from cognitive science as lacking explana-
tory value, the former claims that cognitive science can-
not do without it. According to the content pragmatist, the 
explanatory gloss that accompanies cognitive computational 
explanation cannot be eliminated. For the gloss in terms of 
representational content plays an essential role in allow-
ing cognitive science to explain what it sets out to explain: 
behavioural success in cognitive tasks.
As Neander points out, content pragmatism would col-
lapse into eliminativism were the pragmatist to hold that 
future advancements in the cognitive sciences would dis-
charge the need for the gloss. In that case, the explanatory 
gloss would be a non-essential epistemic device that we now 
need because of the relatively early stage of scientific devel-
opment we are in. In the future, with a fuller picture and a 
better understanding of how it all works computationally and 
neurally, the explanatory gloss, with all its representational 
baggage, would be done away with. If content pragmatism 
corresponded to that view, then it would indeed be a species 
of eliminativism.
On the contrary, content pragmatism sees the explanatory 
gloss as essential to cognitive science, something that further 
scientific developments will never eliminate. Though repre-
sentational content is not part of the computational theory 
proper, it is an essential part of the explanatory gloss, with-
out which it would be impossible to connect the explanan-
tia and explananda of cognitive science. Therefore, content 
pragmatism does not give way to eliminativism.
3.4  Pragmatism and Robust Realism
The most insidious challenge to content pragmatism is 
avoiding its collapse into some form of robust realism about 
representational content. In order to assess this challenge 
in detail, it is worthwhile to recall the essential differences 
between realists and pragmatists about content.
Realists hold that representational content captures some 
observer- or mind-independent feature of cognitive sys-
tems.14 Even though contents are normally posited in the 
course of attempts to explain cognitive phenomena, their 
explanatory value is supposed to hinge on their correspond-
ing, to some degree of accuracy, to features that cognitive 
systems possess, and would possess even in the absence of 
any sentient being having cognitive states about those fea-
tures, as well as the explanatory purposes and practices in 
which those notions are employed.
14 Of course, the notion is not independent of sentient beings and 
their cognitive states insofar as it captures properties of the cognitive 
systems of those beings. But this is not the kind of mind-independ-
ence that is at issue here.
11 See also Cummins (1989, pp. 12–3, 88).
12 In a reply to Neander during the MindsOnline 2015 Conference, 
Egan seemed attracted to a view on these lines. A related account, 
also compatible with this line of argument, is the measure-theoretic 
view of propositional attitudes put forward by Matthews (2011).
13 See Haugeland (1990) for an only partially out-dated overview of 
the options.
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In contrast, for a content pragmatist, ascription of con-
tents to cognitive states depends on conceptual apparatus 
that we as cognitive scientists impose on the world, without 
commitment to their being faithful to its nature and organi-
sation. Contents may be ascribed to systems as part of our 
explanatory practices in order to simplify explanations, to 
allow us more easily to grasp interesting connections, or 
merely because regarding some systems as representing 
proves to be heuristically useful in helping us make sense 
of the goings-on in cognitive systems. The positing of con-
tent is done with an eye to the fruitfulness and heuristic 
value of using this notion, rather than to its corresponding 
to some observer-independent feature of the world. Accord-
ing to pragmatists, in other words, it may well be that the 
notion of content does not capture anything that cognitive 
systems possess independently of the explanatory interests 
and practices that we bring to bear in our scientific under-
standing of the world.
I will examine four arguments that purport to show that 
content pragmatism, in some way or another, fails to provide 
a principled alternative to realism about content. I will try 
and defuse each of them, securing the coherence and interest 
of content pragmatism as a genuine competitor in the search 
for a satisfying theory of the nature and role of representa-
tional content. Once again, please note that I am not arguing 
that content pragmatism is the correct view, only that extant 
objections to the view fail to undermine its coherence.
3.4.1  Neander’s Compatibility Argument
Neander argues that the main claim of the content pragma-
tist, namely that content ascription is relative to explanatory 
aims and interests, is perfectly compatible with robust real-
ism about representational content. What the realist must 
hold on to is that there is, as a matter of fact, an ultimate 
answer about what content those cognitive states actually 
have. Though different content ascriptions are possible, 
given pragmatic considerations, the realist about content 
must insist that there is one (or at most a few) content ascrip-
tions that actually get it right, that actually say something 
true about that cognitive state. The fact that content ascrip-
tions—the emphasis is present throughout Neander’s argu-
ment—are variegated is no reason to embrace pragmatism 
about content. Competing ascriptions are compatible with 
content realism. I think Neander is right.
However, the presence of competing ascriptions is not 
the crucial tenet of content pragmatism. The content prag-
matist claims, much more strongly, that there is nothing over 
and above content ascription. There is no fact of the matter 
about what a cognitive state represents that is separate and 
independent from practices of ascription informed by prag-
matic considerations. It is not the fact that different content 
ascriptions are possible given different explanatory interests 
that should motivate the content pragmatist. As Neander cor-
rectly points out, this is compatible with the realist picture. 
What is incompatible with that picture is the further claim 
that there is no fact of the matter about what a cognitive 
state represents—different content ascriptions are possible, 
all of which may play crucial roles in different explanatory 
glosses (or even in one and the same), without any involving 
ontological claims about cognitive states having represen-
tational contents.
This is, of course, just conceptual clarification about the 
tenets of content pragmatism. It does not tackle the motiva-
tions for upholding the view, nor defends its cogency.
3.4.2  Ramsey Against the Argument from Environmental 
Neutrality
An argument that plays an important role for Egan in moti-
vating content pragmatism is the argument from environ-
mental neutrality of computational individuation. Egan 
(2009, 2014b) shows that computational mechanisms that 
contribute to a cognitive task in one type of organism in one 
type of environment (say, computing shape from shading) 
can be transferred to a different environment or a different 
organism and play a different role (say, in audition), despite 
the fact that they still compute the same mathematical func-
tion. Thus different representational contents are ascribed to 
one and the same computational mechanism when embed-
ded in different organisms and environments. This fact, Egan 
believes, argues against robust realism about content—it 
would show that representational contents are not essential 
to computational mechanisms, since ascription of the the 
former varies wildly when the latter are kept fixed, and only 
the embedding context is changed.
Ramsey has recently argued that this argument will not 
do. I believe that he is right—as it stands, Egan’s argument 
does not provide reasons to prefer content pragmatism over 
content realism. For the fact that the same computational 
mechanism, by computing the same mathematical function, 
can have different contents when embedded in different 
organisms and different environments, does not jeopardise 
its having fairly determinate contents in the actual organisms 
it is embedded in. Computational mechanisms have been 
plausibly selected for the functions they compute because 
they contributed to successful behaviour in a specific species 
of organism and type of environment—alternative contents 
they might have had given different evolutionary stories or 
different embedding contexts are thereby irrelevant.
To avoid the objection, the content pragmatist must be 
more radical in their claims. They must claim that represen-
tational content is ascribed to different computational states 
and processes, and different combinations thereof, given 
different contexts and cognitive tasks in the same type of 
organism and the same type of environment; and this due 
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to heuristic and pragmatic reasons tied to our interests and 
practices. If this is so, then content is not essential to com-
putational states even in the same organism in the same envi-
ronment—an outcome difficult to square with robust realism 
about content, given the considerable indeterminacy of con-
tent and of vehicle individuation across contexts that fol-
lows.15 This is largely an empirical hypothesis, which only 
empirical work can vindicate or disprove.16 It is though to 
some extent also a warning: unproblematically endorsing the 
robust realist view of representation and vehicle individua-
tion can skew theorists’ and scientists’ interpretation of the 
available data, generating puzzles and questions that would 
be misplaced given a more flexible (pragmatist) view of the 
role of representational content in cognitive science.
3.4.3  Arguing from Despair
A further objection to content pragmatism has it that it is 
prima facie radically revisionist of scientific practice. Robust 
realism about content, it is argued, is the default position, 
and thereby the burden of proof lies with the pragmatist. 
The pragmatist, that is, must shown that content realism is 
false, or at least questionable, calling hence for exploration 
of alternative paths.
As already hinted in Sect. 3.1, this line of argument is 
problematic. Scientific practice, though apparently com-
mitted to the ontological reality of representational content, 
is compatible with the move recommended by the content 
pragmatist, namely relegating content to the explanatory 
gloss. Taking scientists at their word can be misleading—
talk of representation might not really refer to robust notions 
of representation; and, argues the content pragmatist, talk 
of representation need not be ontologically committing. So 
the claim that content pragmatism is revisionist is too quick, 
and too rash. Indeed, Egan’s motivation for developing her 
version of content pragmatism stems from a close examina-
tion of work in computational psychology and neuroscience 
done by the likes of David Marr, Reza Shadmer and Steven 
Wise. Content pragmatism has as much claim to being the 
‘default scientific position’ as content realism, appearances 
to the contrary notwithstanding. Scientists are typically sat-
isfied with making use of conceptual apparatus that lead 
to successful theorising and prediction, without worrying 
enough about the ontological status of that apparatus to 
allow us to determine whether they would rather endorse 
content realism or content pragmatism.
Most importantly, extant robust realist theories of con-
tent face enormous difficulties in delivering what they set 
out to deliver. Robust realists hope to provide naturalistic 
conditions that bestow fairly determinate content on cogni-
tive states and processes (e.g., Dretske 1981, 1988; Millikan 
1984; Fodor 1987). Representations are seen as identifiable, 
repeatable, and composable cognitive structures that have 
specific contents due to their standing in special natural-
istic relations to what they represent in the world (Fodor, 
1975). However, such theories have so far failed to provide 
accounts of content that satisfactorily deal with liberality of 
representational status, indeterminacy problems, and mis-
representation. This is, I take, the most powerful motivation 
for developing an alternative to robust realism about content 
on pragmatist lines—what Neander calls the ‘argument from 
despair’.
I will not repeat here the rich debate that, especially in the 
80s and 90s, explored robust realist theories of content and 
their shortcomings. I will rather just point to the well-known 
problems that plague these theories.
First, there are issues regarding the liberality of the notion 
of representation that follows from robust realist accounts. 
The proposed naturalistic reductions of representation make 
it so that states and processes of non-biological systems, as 
well as very simple biological systems, count as represen-
tational. There is nothing specifically cognitive or mental 
about those states that realist theories identify as represen-
tational (Burge, 2010; Morgan, 2014). It follows that rep-
resentations are widespread and have no special cognitive 
value, ‘debasing’ the notion of representation and hurting its 
explanatory value in the cognitive sciences.
Second, and more damningly, robust realist theories 
have failed to provide satisfactory conditions for bestowing 
determinate representational content.17 Several indetermi-
nacy problems have been discussed in the literature, many 
of which have not been satisfactorily solved, including: the 
problem of error (Fodor 1984), the problem of distality 
(Dretske 1986), Quinean indeterminacy (Gates 1996), and 
functional indeterminacy (Fodor 1990).
Indeterminacy of content is widely seen as a serious 
shortcoming for theories of content. Indeterminacy jeop-
ardises the explanatory role that representation is supposed 
to play in the cognitive sciences. If we cannot determine at 
least to some level of precision the content of a represen-
tational state, appeal to representation in order to explain 
17 For a review of the most influential theories, and their main prob-
lems, see Ryder (2009).
15 This is not incompatible with content realism per se, but it is 
incompatible with mainstream robust realism about representation, 
which sees representations as stable and repeatable cognitive struc-
tures. Non-robust realist views are therefore in the cards, but outside 
the scope of this paper. At any rate, the pragmatist’s insistence that 
such variety of content ascriptions stems at least partly from heuris-
tic and pragmatic considerations is incompatible with realism tout 
court—provided that the points in Sect. 3.4.1 be kept in mind.
16 Such a hypothesis is in line with neural reuse theories. For a 
review of the theories and the evidence for them, see Anderson 
(2010).
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specific behaviour loses much of its value. Moreover, inde-
terminacy of content imperils the possibility of giving 
an account of misrepresentation, generally taken to be an 
essential requirement for a satisfactory theory of content 
(Cummins 1996). Given indeterminacy, some content can 
in most cases be found such that a representation correctly 
represents it.
The second step of the argument from despair has it that 
content pragmatism can succeed where robust realist theo-
ries fail.
Content pragmatism has indeed the tools to avoid the 
indeterminacy problems that plague robust realist theo-
ries. First, indeterminacy of content is a problem only if 
there is a commitment to there being cognitive states that 
essentially bear content. The content pragmatist can deny 
that representational content is a real property of cogni-
tive states, and reject the view that cognitive states are 
essentially individuated by their contents. Second, repre-
sentational content, being part of the explanatory gloss, is 
ascribed with pragmatic considerations in view. Depending 
on explanatory aims and interests, different specific contents 
may be ascribed to the same cognitive state. Determinacy 
is achieved if and to the extent that it is explanatorily useful 
relative to the relevant pragmatic considerations. Misrep-
resentation is similarly handled. It is only given a certain 
pragmatic background in which a choice has been made on 
what content to ascribe to a certain computational state that 
questions about representational correctness or misrepresen-
tation can be evaluated.
In sum, the argument from despair gives us good reason 
to take content pragmatism as a serious candidate; the fail-
ures of current robust realist accounts, which content prag-
matism does not share, puts the latter, if not in advantage in 
the overall debate, at least on an equal footing. The argument 
from despair cannot be simply dismissed.
3.4.4  Glossing Reality
The final argument against content pragmatism that I will 
examine is, I believe, also the most threatening. It tackles 
head-on a crucial difficulty that content pragmatism has to 
face, namely providing grounds for seeing representational 
content as explanatory, whilst withholding ontological com-
mitment to the notion. That is, the content pragmatist must 
answer the pressing question: if talk of representational con-
tent cannot be eliminated from cognitive science, even after 
future progress, why then reject the idea that content ascrip-
tion is capturing something real about cognitive systems?
Critics of content pragmatism argue that it cannot justify 
the fracture between explanation and ontology that lies at 
the heart of the view.18 Importantly, this fracture is not a 
general one; it does not apply to every, or even most, scien-
tific posits—a position characteristic of full-blown scientific 
pragmatism. By content pragmatism’s lights, the fracture 
comes in for representational content, but not for other scien-
tific entities, such as computational vehicles and processes. 
The guiding idea is, indeed, to cling to realism about the lat-
ter, while shifting to pragmatism about the former. Content 
pragmatists must provide principled reasons to believe that 
a notion that is explanatorily ineliminable from cognitive 
science—representational content—should not be seen as 
ontologically committing; whilst other putative explanato-
rily ineliminable notions—such as computational mecha-
nisms—should be so seen. Unless such principled reasons 
are provided, the critic presses on, content pragmatism is 
unjustified. Why set the pragmatism/realism border there, 
rather than somewhere else, or not at all?
I think there are good, albeit defeasible, motivations for 
placing the border right there. Cognitive science aims at 
furnishing a fully naturalistic account of what cognition is 
and how it works. Notions whose naturalistic credentials 
are dubious should not compose the theory proper, on pain 
of endangering the scientific status of the field. Representa-
tion and content are clearly problematic in this regard. It is 
indeed both due to their apparent resistance to naturalisa-
tion, and to their explanatory role in cognitive science, that 
philosophers have been so keen on trying and giving robust 
naturalistic treatments of these notions.
Forty years or so of focused efforts, however, have yielded 
little success, as the ‘argument from despair’ suggests. It is 
thus an open question whether representation and content 
will ever be naturalised, at least in the way robust realism 
would want. This fundamental doubt is enough, I submit, 
to justify scepticism toward a realist take on those notions. 
It is enough, crucially, to justify quarantining representa-
tional content in a pragmatically-motivated, non-naturalistic, 
explanatory gloss. Perhaps future work will give us the much 
sought naturalisation of representational content. If this 
should be so, content pragmatism will arguably lose most 
of its motivation. However, until that happy day arrives, if it 
does, content pragmatism is justified in its project of pursu-
ing a different path—an alternative way of seeing the role 
played by representational content in cognitive science, i.e. 
not as part of the naturalistic theory proper, but as part of 
a supplementary non-naturalistic explanatory edifice, built 
by us, for us, in light of our interests, capacities, and aims.
This is just the first step of the rejoinder, however. I have 
so far showed only that, given our current knowledge, repre-
sentational content possibly lies outside the border of what 
18 I thank an anonymous reviewer to this journal for framing the crit-
icism at hand in this clear and pointed way.
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we should ontologically commit to. Similar considerations to 
the above suggest that, as content pragmatism would want, 
computational mechanisms are to be found on the inner side 
of that border. For concrete computation, i.e. computation 
in physical systems, seems a much more promising candi-
date for naturalisation than representational content. Despite 
some early scepticism about the prospects of naturalising 
computation (e.g. Putnam 1988; Searle 1992), recent pro-
posals are much more robust, in particular the mechanis-
tic view (Piccinini 2015; Milkowski 2013; Fresco 2014). 
If concrete computation is a natural phenomenon, there is 
no impediment to its appearing in scientific theories. The 
fate of content pragmatism thus hinges on whether concrete 
computation, in contrast to representational content, will be 
satisfyingly naturalised.
In sum, there are plausible, though certainly defeasible 
reasons to believe that computational states and processes 
are acceptable components of a naturalistic story about 
cognition. And there are equally plausible, and equally 
defeasible, reasons to believe that representational contents 
are not. This is justification enough to hold, in the current 
state of play, that the localised fracture between explanation 
and ontology may fall where content pragmatism claims it 
does; though this may prove to be wrong given future devel-
opments, it is not an incoherent or ungrounded position.
Even conceding that there are cogent reasons to uphold 
the localised fracture between explanation and ontology that 
content pragmatism advocates, the critic may still not be sat-
isfied, and rightly so. For now content pragmatism seems to 
flirt dangerously with eliminativism. The burning question 
thus becomes: if representational content is a bad candidate 
for figuring in a naturalistic theory of cognition, why not get 
rid of the notion entirely, as the eliminativist recommends?
To assuage that worry, content pragmatism reminds us 
that representational content can never be eliminated 
from the explanatory gloss because of the nature of the 
explananda in cognitive science. Since those explananda are 
characterised as cognitive abilities having to do with robust 
successful interaction between organism and environment, 
the only way to make the computational explanantia cogent 
as explanations of those abilities is to see their components 
and processes as representations of the body and environ-
ment. A commitment to robust realism about content does 
not follow, but neither does an elimination of the notion from 
explanations in cognitive science.
Content becomes explanatorily ineliminable once we 
see physical systems as cognitive systems, bringing thus 
to bear our explanatory interests in making sense of their 
behaviour, understood in its turn as performance of cognitive 
abilities. It is only when we take a specific perspective—
a ‘stance’—toward physical systems that representational 
content becomes something we cannot do without in mak-
ing perspicuous how the computational goings-on explain 
behaviours characterised as cognitive. Taking such a stance 
brings with it a host of pragmatic factors that inform content 
ascription in the pragmatist picture. Therefore, the fact that, 
as the content pragmatist claims, the explanatory gloss in 
representational terms will never be eliminated from cogni-
tive science (though it may undergo changes as the science 
progresses), does not entail that content corresponds to some 
property that cognitive systems and their internal states actu-
ally possess.
Thus the collapse into content realism is avoided. At the 
same time, collapse into eliminativism is also averted: the 
explananda of cognitive science require that content be 
ascribed to (some) of their explanantia in order to make 
intelligible to us how the latter enable the former. We get 
what the critic feared was not to be had: explanatory inelimi-
nability of content, without ontological commitment—i.e. 
the localised fracture between explanation and ontology that 
content pragmatism champions. This retort has an obvious 
shortcoming: it makes representational content parasitic on 
the intentional contents involved in the relevant perspective-
taking, an account of which the content pragmatist does not 
offer. However, as we have seen above, there are possible 
non-robustly realist accounts of intentional content that are 
compatible with the spirit of content pragmatism about rep-
resentational content.
4  Concluding Remarks
Much can be said about the conceptual and empirical advan-
tages and shortcomings of content pragmatism vis-à-vis its 
realist, eliminativist, and primitivist competitors. Such treat-
ment is though beyond the scope of the paper. My quite 
limited aim was not to show that content pragmatism is the 
right, or even the best theory of representation currently on 
offer. My rather more modest objective has been to show 
that it is a coherent and plausible position which deserves 
careful consideration in the debate. I have argued that extant 
objections to content pragmatism are less convincing than 
they might seem at first glance. Content pragmatism is not 
at odds with scientific practice, and it is not a disguised ver-
sion of the traditional options normally taken to exhaust the 
conceptual landscape. The pragmatist can therefore main-
tain their allegiance to the ineliminability of the notion of 
representation and content from cognitive science, while at 
the same time avoiding the view’s collapse into primitivism, 
eliminativism, or realism.
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